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ELIMINATING DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL SPEECH: REPLACING
REGULATION WITH GOVERNMENT COUNTERSPEECH
The first amendment to the United States Constitution protects an
individual's right to engage in free speech without fear of government
retribution.' Historically, the first amendment provides full protection to
political speech based on the belief that freedom of expression is necessary
both to obtain a political truth and to promote a representative and
participatory government. 2 Although political speech continues to maintain
a preferred status,3 the courts have not afforded the same protections to
certain other types of speech. 4 In particular, in 1942 the United States
Supreme Court initially determined that "purely commercial advertising"
was not worthy of any first amendment protection. 5 Thirty-five years later,
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment states that '$Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
2. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927), rev'd, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (elaborating on history of framers' intent in enacting first amendment
as preferring form of government in which deliberative forces prevail over arbitrary ones);
infra note 15 (discussing exceptions to unqualified protection of political speech).
3. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (commenting on central importance of
protecting speech on public issues); Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Town of Southington,
508 F. Supp. 43, 47 (D.Conn. 1980) (noting that, in first amendment analysis, political speech
holds preferred position).
4. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-64 (1982) (holding that, because of child
pornography's effect on physical and mental health of children, states granted wide latitude
to regulate pornographic publications); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618, reh'g
denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969) (holding that employers' threats of retaliation for labor activities
of employees are subject to regulation as unfair labor practice); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (holding that states constitutionally may review incitement to riot);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957) (holding that
first amendment does not protect obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 265-67,
reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 988 (1952) (upholding statute that proscribed publications portraying
class of citizens in defamatory light); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
(holding that fighting words are distinct type of speech punishable without implicating first
amendment).
5. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that Constitution does
not limit state and municipalities' regulation of use of streets for purely commercial advertising).
In Valentine, the Supreme Court considered whether restricting distribution of commercial
speech is an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech. Id. at 54. The respondent in
Valentine distributed handbills that solicited visitors to view his submarine exhibit. Id. at 52-
53. Respondent subsequently was prosecuted for violating a New York City ordinance that
proscribed the distribution of handbills containing commercial advertisements. Id. at 53-54.
Respondent claimed in his defense that because he added information of "public interest" to
the flip side of the handbill, he did not violate the ordinance. Id. at 55.
In determining whether the respondent had violated the ordinance, the Supreme Court
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however, the Supreme Court deviated from its original position and moved
toward granting commercial speech 6 the same treatment that the Court
afforded to political speech under the first amendment. 7 Thus, without
completely overruling the nonprotected status of commercial speech, the
Court broadened the first amendment protection afforded to commercial
speech, which at the very least tempered the Court's prior restrictions on
commercial speech.8
reasoned that, although the government may not interfere with the dissemination of public
interest information in public thoroughfares, the Constitution does not preclude such interfer-
ence when the information is of a commercial nature. Id. at 54. Although not expressly stated,
the Court focused the distinction between "public interest" information and "commercial"
information on two issues. Id. First, the Court reasoned that commercial speech traditionally
does not address political or social issues. Id. at 55. Second, the Court further reasoned that
motivation for commercial speech primarily, if not solely, is to generate profit rather than to
participate in public discourse. Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the double-
sided handbill the respondent distributed containing commercial matters adequately constituted
commercial speech to violate the city ordinance. Id.
6. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
385, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973) (defining commercial speech as speech that does no
more than propose commercial transaction); also BLAcK's LAW DiCTIONARY 245 (5th ed. 1979)
(defining commercial speech as "speech that advertises a product or service for profit or for
business purpose").
7. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975); also infra note 8
(discussing extent of unqualified protection given to commercial speech). The Supreme Court
in Virginia Pharmacy considered whether a Virginia statute that prohibited licensed pharmacists
from advertising the prices of prescription drugs was unconstitutional under the first and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 749-50. In Virginia Pharmacy
appellees were drug consumers who claimed that they would benefit if the State Pharmacy
Board lifted the prohibition on advertising prescription drug prices. Id. at 753. The appellees
further claimed that the first amendment protects prescription drug users' right to receive
information from pharmacists. Id. at 753-54. Appellants, the State Pharmacy Board, contended
that drug price information was commercial speech, and therefore did not merit full first
amendment protection. Id. at 758.
In determining whether consumers have a first amendment right to receive prescription
drug prices, the United States Supreme Court initially noted that, because of extensive state
regulations overseeing the conduct of pharmacists, release of drug price information would
not affect adversely the professionalism of pharmacists. Id. at 766-69. The state legislature,
the Court offered, may protect the health and well-being of its citizens by regulating phar-
macists' conduct, but not by suppressing otherwise legal information of drug pricing. Id. at
769. The Court conceded that commercial speech is not immune from state regulation, but
reasoned that when a statute uses the content of speech to bar its dissemination, that statute
is unconstitutional. Id. at 770.
Therefore, the Virginia Pharmacy Court concluded that speech which does "no more
than propose a commercial transaction" does not lack first amendment protection. Id. The
Court further held that consumers and society in general have an interest in the free flow of
commercial information which allows all individuals to make the most educated and informed
private economic decisions. Id. at 770-73.
8. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 755 (holding that decisions subsequent to
Valentine relax nonprotected status of commercial advertising in favor of protection when first
amendment interest in free flow of information outweighs state interest in regulating); Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819-20 (1975) (asserting that holding in Valentine permitted
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The Supreme Court deviated from its original nonprotectionist position
and moved toward granting commercial speech first amendment protection
on the ground that states have no constitutionally derived interest in
depriving consumers of truthful, nonmisleading information necessary for
the consumers' informed decisionmaking. 9 The Court reasoned that individ-
ual consumers' and the general public's constitutional interest in the free
flow of commercial information outweigh the state's interest in regulating
commercial speech. 10 The Court, therefore, rejected the contention that,
because advertisers speak to make money and not to participate in demo-
cratic government, the advertisers' economic motive disqualifies them from
protection under the first amendment."
After the Supreme Court's grant of first amendment protection to
commercial speech,' 2 the Court subsequently retreated by affording only
qualified protection to commercial speech. 3 Instead of allowing complete
protection for commercial speech, the Supreme Court upheld state regulation
of certain commercial speech by identifying compelling state interests that
outweigh the first amendment interest of listeners to receive information.
4
governmental regulation of commercial advertising, but that not all such regulations would be
immune from constitutional challenge); also Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54 (holding that only
regulation of "purely commercial advertising" would be immune from review). The Bigelow
Court is implying that the Valentine decision would support regulation of "partially" com-
mercial advertising. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 820 n.6.
9. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-64 (referring to consumer's and society's
interest in free flow of commercial information); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975)
(same).
10. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 463-65 (holding that free flow of information is
necessary to enlighten public decisionmaking in democracy and, therefore, outweighs state
interest in regulation); also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826-27 (1975) (holding that
Bigelow Court did not have to decide expressly that first amendment interest outweighs public
interest in regulation, but that future courts must balance two interests and, in some cases,
first amendment interest could prevail).
11. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762-63 (holding that advertisers' economic
interests should not disqualify advertisers' speech from first amendment protection); Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-21 (1975) (holding that advertisers' motive of financial gain
should not narrow first amendment protection of commercial advertising); also Note, Devel-
opments in the Law: Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1005, 1027 (1967) (disclaiming
profit motive or desire to influence private economic decisionmaking as means of distinguishing
commercial speech from political speech).
12. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's peak
protection for commercial speech).
13. See infra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's gradual
withering of support for protection of commercial speech).
14. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 342-43 (1986)
(holding that state can ban truthful advertising of casino gambling to reduce demand for
casino gambling and to protect health, safety and welfare of citizens); Metromedia, Inc. v.
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 503-12 (1981) (holding that state can ban commercfal billboards to
improve traffic safety or aesthetics of city, regardless of lack of regulation of political
billboards); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
561-66 (1980) (holding that state can regulate commercial informational advertising by electric
utility as long as regulation advances state's substantial interest in energy conservation); cf.
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Thus, the Court's recognition that certain state interests could override an
individual's first amendment interest gradually has eroded the constitutional
guarantee of free commercial speech that the Court earlier had espoused. 5
The Supreme Court based its retreat from protecting commercial speech
on a "commonsense" distinction between commercial speech and other
types of speech.' 6 The Court supported the distinction on the grounds that
commercial speech is both more "verifiable"'17 and more "durable"'" than
political speech. 9 First, in elaborating on verifiability, the Court reasoned
that because commercial speakers create and produce the products adver-
tised, commercial speakers do not need to compete in a commercial "mar-
ketplace of ideas" 20 to provide an accurate and verifiable advertisement. 2'
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540-43 (1980) (holding that
state cannot prohibit discussion of controversial political issues in billing envelopes just to
protect singular view from being forced on captive audience).
15. See supra note 14 (listing cases in which court has deferred to asserted governmental
interest in regulating commercial speech despite individual's first amendment interest); cf. New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (developing exception to protection
of political speech if speech will cause direct, immediate, and irreparable harm); Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that advocacy of use of force or law to effect
political and economic change is not protected if speech is intended to produce imminent
lawless action and is likely to produce such action); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716
(1931) (creating exception to protection of political speech under first amendment if speech
obstructs recruiting of military or if speech publishes sailing dates of trooas).
16. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (distinguishing speech that does nothing more than propose
commercial transaction from other types of speech).
17. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (defining and discussing verifiability as
grounds for distinguishing commercial from political speech).
18. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (defining and discussing durability as
second ground for distinguishing commercial from political speech).
19. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24; see also Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 n.6 (1980) (stating that, because commercial
speech is offspring of economic self-interest and other types of speech are not, commercial
speech is different and theoretically more resilient when regulated).
20. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(outlining Court's first use of "marketplace of ideas" analysis). Holmes argues that truth is
the power of thought to become accepted publicly after a free trade of ideas, and therefore,
competition in a marketplace of ideas results in ultimate good. Id.
21. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976). The Virginia Pharmacy Court reasoned that the goal of freedom
of expression is to insure the free flow of truthful and legitimate information. Id. The Court
further reasons that, because commercial speech is distinct from other types of speech, the
Court must afford commercial speech a different degree of protection to insure that the initial
goal of unimpaired truthful information is realized. Id.; see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that first amendment preserves uninhibited market-
place of ideas in which truth ultimately prevails); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 776-77, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978) (holding that speech from corporation
rather than from individual is still indispensable to decisionmaking in democracy); Virginia
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (holding that free flow of commercial information insures public
interest in rational decisionmaking); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 828-29 (1975) (holding
that policy of first amendment favors dissemination of information and opinions free from
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The Court further reasoned, however, that political speakers such as the
press22 rely on soliciting information from others before disseminating the
information to the public.? Therefore, the Court concluded that the ability
of commercial speakers independently to create advertisements makes com-
mercial speech more verifiable than political speech which requires the input
of others before entering the marketplace of ideas. 24
In addition to the verifiability of commercial speech, the Court main-
tained that durability is a second ground for distinguishing commercial
speech from political speech. 25 The Court reasoned that commercial speech
is more durable than political speech because to a commercial speaker
advertising is absolutely imperative as the medium to gain product visibility
and eventual sales, neither of which is a primary goal for a political
speaker.26 Therefore, the Supreme Court reasoned that the state's interest
in insuring clarity in advertisements by limiting the freedom of commercial
expression never will force the seller into entirely foregoing advertising. 27
Conversely, the Court reasoned that limiting political speech permanently
undermines the possibility of a participatory democracy dependent on the
free exchange of ideas.2
Later, the Supreme Court further expanded the distinction between
commercial and political speech by determining that, although the free flow
of truthful, legitimate information is important, 29 the state nonetheless may
limit the flow of truthful commercial advertising if such limitation furthers
governmental action). See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (stating theory of United States Constitution that free trade of ideas results in
collective good).
22. See Mill v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (defining constitutional role of press
as political speaker in informing and educating public, in offering criticism, and in providing
forum for discussion and debate).
23. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
24. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text (distinguishing verifiability of com-
mercial and political speech).
25. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Virginia Pharmacy Court assumes that commercial speakers are so dependent
on advertising to maintain profit margins that commercial speakers would rather comply with
state regulations than forego advertising altogether. Id.
28. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (stating that
individuals making contributions to political campaigns or to groups organized on behalf of
express interests are engaging in protected speech indispensable to democratic decisionmaking);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (stating that speech concerning public affairs
is essence of self-government); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, reh'g denied,
326 U.S. 802 (1945) (stating that self-government is undermined when government suppresses
competing views on public issues from opposing scrutiny); supra note 21 (listing cases where
protection of political speech preserves a functioning democracy); also A. ME .ajom, FRE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GovERNMENT 24-26 (1948) (stating that first amendment
primarily thought to be instrument designed to enlighten public decisionmaking in democracy).
29. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (specifying goal of freedom of expression as free flow of truthful
information).
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a substantial state interest.3 0 The Court determined, however, that if a state
is regulating commercial speech that is neither misleading nor illegal, the
state not only must have a substantial interest in regulating the speech but
the state also must narrowly tailor the regulation to protect the substantial
interest."
30. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563-65 (1980). In Central Hudson, the Court considered whether a regulation of the Public
Service Commission of the State of New York that completely banned an electric utility's
advertisements promoting the use of electricity violated the first and fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution. Id. at 559. The Central Hudson Court noted that while
banning promotional advertising, the Commission's order explicitly permitted "informational"
advertising designed to level electrical consumption from peak periods to low periods. Id. at
561. The Court reasoned that, because of the commonsense distinction between commercial
and political speech, the former is accorded lesser protection than other constitutionally
guaranteed expressions. Id. at 563-64. Therefore, the Court further reasoned that the protection
available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature of both the expression and
the governmental interests which the regulation served. Id.
The Central Hudson Court then outlined a four-part analysis for commercial speech
cases. Id. at 567. First, the reviewing court should determine whether the expression is subject
to first amendment protection. Id. The Court noted that this prong requires that the speech
be both lawful and not misleading. Id. Second, the reviewing court must determine whether
the asserted governmental interest is substantial. Id. The Court cautioned that the reviewing
court must answer both prongs affirmatively to proceed to the third prong of whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted. Id. The final question for the
reviewing court is whether the regulation is more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted
interest. Id.
In applying the four-pronged test, the Central Hudson Court conceded that the promo-
tional advertising was truthful and legal information. Id. The Court also recognized that the
state's interest in energy conservation was substantial and that the order restricting promotional
advertising advanced the state's interest. Id. at 569. However, the Court reasoned that a
complete ban on promotional advertising is not the least restrictive means to achieve the
desired end of energy conservation. Id. at 570-71. Thus, in striking down the Commission's
order, the Court concluded that the order could not withstand constitutional scrutiny because
advertisements that would not impede energy conservation indiscriminately were prohibited as
well as the advertisements which did impede the state's interest. Id. at 567-72.
31. Id. at 564-65. But cf. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 109
S. Ct. 3028 (1989) (holding that means need only be "reasonable fit" with end rather than
"narrowly tailored" to end). In SUNY, the Court considered whether governmental restrictions
upon commercial speech need to be the least restrictive means necessary to achieve a desired
end. Id. at 3030. SUNY claimed that by holding a "Tupperware party" (sale of household
goods) in a student's dormitory room, American Future Systems, Inc. violated university
regulations that prohibit the use of school property for private commercial enterprise. Id. In
response, students claimed SUNY violated their first amendment rights by prohibiting "com-
mercial invitees" from entering students' rooms. Id.
In determining whether the regulation violated the students' first amendment rights, the
Supreme Court analyzed the propriety of SUNY's restrictions on commercial speech by using
the four-pronged test outlined in Central Hudson. Id. at 3032; also supra note 29 (outlining
Central Hudson four-prong test). Under the first prong, the parties agreed that the speech at
issue was legal and not misleading, and, therefore, was entitled to first amendment protection.
Id. Under the second and third prongs, the Court maintained that the asserted governmental
interest in supporting an educational rather than a commercial atmosphere at the University
1134
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As the Supreme Court shifted from maximum first amendment protec-
tion of commercial speech to its current position of qualified protection,
the Court created a bright line distinction between commercial and political
speech.32 In making that distinction the Court relied on its assumptions that
commercial speech is both more verifiable and more durable than political
speech.33 Because the Court has created clear delineations between commer-
cial speech and political speech and afforded commercial speech a lesser
value under the first amendment, the Court effectively has relegated com-
mercial speech beyond the bounds of most first amendment protection.
4
By using the bright line distinction between commercial speech and
political speech to restrict the first amendment protection of commercial
speech, the Supreme Court unjustifiably has retreated from its previous
position of granting commercial speech full first amendment protection.3"
First, the Court's retreat is unjustifiable because the Court's determination
that commercial speech is both more verifiable and more durable than
political speech is based on faulty assumptions26 Second, even if the Court's
determination regarding the verifiability and the durability of commercial
speech is correct, the Court does not possess the ability to differentiate
accurately between the two types of speech.
37
was substantial and was advanced by the regulation. Id.
However, with regard to the final prong that the regulation be no more extensive than
necessary, the Court reasoned that a state need not impose the "least restrictive means" to
comply with the language of the Central Hudson Court. Id. at 3032-34. Rather, the Court
required only a "reasonable fit" between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to
accomplish those ends. Id. at 3035. The Court justified the liberalization of the test by placing
the affirmative burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fit on the government. Id.
Therefore, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the
means reasonably fit with the asserted ends to justify the university regulation. Id. at 3038.
32. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's distinctions
between commercial and political speech).
33. See supra notes 16-28 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's grounds
and rationale for believing that commercial speech is both more verifiable and more durable
than political speech).
34. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56, reh'g denied, 439 U.S.
883 (1978) (holding that commercial speech is afforded only a limited measure of protection
consistent with speech's subordinate position in scale of first amendment values); cf. Shiffrin,
The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1212, 1219 (1983) (stating that although Supreme Court
endorsed different treatment of commercial and political speech, Court equated constitutional
value of each type of speech). But see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing
how free flow of information in marketplace of ideas is crucial to obtaining truth and
sustaining participatory democracy).
35. See infra notes 38-65 and accompanying text (discussing failings of Supreme Court's
two distinctions between commercial and political speech); also supra notes 6-11 and accom-
panying text (discussing Supreme Court's granting commercial speech full first amendment
protection despite competing governmental interests).
36. See infra notes 38-65 and accompanying text (discussing improper foundation for
Supreme Court's belief that commercial speech is both more verifiable and more durable than
political speech); also supra notes 16-28 and accompanying text (discussing Court's position
on commercial speech's greater verifiability and durability).
37. See infra notes 66-97 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's inability
11351990]
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With regard to the Court's first assumption that commercial speech is
more verifiable than political speech, the Court fails to recognize the
distinction between a commercial speaker's ability and a consumer's ability
to verify the truth of commercial speech, or more specifically, the ability
of the product to perform adequately. 8 The Court properly recognizes that
the commercial speaker intuitively is able to depict accurately a product or
service that the particular speaker developed.3 9 The Court, however, fails
to recognize that the speech is unverifiable to the listener that has not first
purchased the product.40 Instead, the Court reasons that the seller's unique
ability to access its internally generated resources to obtain accurate infor-
mation about the product offered is beneficial to the listener. 41 Regardless
of the potential benefit, the Court's reasoning discounts that the seller has
the power to refrain from divulging all of the objective information available
to the seller. 42 Further, regardless of the truth of what a seller ultimately
divulges to a consumer, the commercial marketplace of ideas, unlike the
political marketplace of ideas, is not organized to allow a reciprocal exchange
of information between the consumer and the seller.
43
A recent example of the superiority of the political marketplace of ideas
in verifying information lies in the debate over the safety of the Suzuki
Samurai. 44 For instance, in the commercial context, where a consumer views
to differentiate accurately between commercial and political speech); also supra notes 16-28
and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's position on commercial speech's verifia-
bility and durability).
38. See infra notes 39-58 and accompanying text (discussing failings of Supreme Court's
"verifiability" ground for distinguishing commercial speech from political speech); also supra
notes 20-24 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's position on commercial speech's
greater verifiability).
39. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (asserting that truth of commercial speech is more verifiable
because advertiser is relaying information about product or service that he personally provides
and presumably knows more about than anyone else); Id. at 777 (Stewart, J. concurring)
(distinguishing commercial speaker from political speaker because former knows products and
verifies information before disseminating to public).
40. See infra notes 41-58 and accompanying text (discussing consumer's inability to verify
information received through commercial advertising).
41. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 (claiming that ability of commercial
speaker to verify advertisement benefits listener because latter receives more accurate message);
also id. at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that commercial advertiser verifies accuracy
of factual representations before disseminating message to public).
42. See id. at 775 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (stating that advertising itself is inherently
deceptive because of variability of information released from advertiser to advertiser regarding
given product).
43. See id. at 765 (stating that advertising is dissemination rather than exchange of
information regarding who is producing and selling given product, for what use, and at what
cost); also infra notes 45-58 and accompanying text (demonstrating inadequacy of commercial
marketplace of ideas to allow exchange of information between consumers and product or
service providers).
44. See infra notes 45-58 and accompanying text (paralleling verifiability of information
in both political and commercial marketplace in context of Suzuki Samurai defects).
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an advertisement for Suzuki Samurais 4 that describes the fun and versatility
of the vehicle, the consumer has no forum to channel queries about the
tendency for the Samurai to tip when rounding corners. 46 More specifically,
if the consumer believes that the advertisement is untruthful or misleading47
(the vehicles do in fact tip when they round corners), the consumer has no
practical forum in the commercial context to actively counterspeak. 41 In
addition to the absence of a forum in which the consumer can speak, the
consumer has no incentive to speak because the cost of speaking far
outweighs the marginal benefit to the consumer as an individual.4 9 Instead,
the consumer simply fails to purchase the vehicle (an individual economic
decision), but the misleading advertisements continue to deceive and poten-
tially to harm other consumers."
The political marketplace of ideas deals more efficiently with the same
defect in Suzuki Samurais.51 For example, a consumer who is dissatisfied
with the performance of Suzuki Samurais may contact at minimal cost a
legislator about the dangers of the vehicle.sz Because of the minimal cost,
a variety of consumers will have the incentive to speak to their legislators,
while alternately, because of the extreme cost of television advertisements
or public information campaigns, consumers will have no incentive in a
commercial marketplace to air publicly their discontent with Suzuki. 5 The
45. Suzuki Samurai is a light-weight, four-wheel drive sport-utility vehicle designed and
manufactured by Suzuki Motors Co., Ltd. (a Japanese corporation) and United States Suzuki
Motor Corp. (an American subsidiary). See Rudd, Suit Here Targets Suzuki Samurai, Chicago
Trib., Jan. 7, 1989, at C 8 (referring to Suzuki Samurai as four-wheel drive sport-utility
vehicle); In Re Suzuki Samurai Products Liability Litigation, 1989 WL 79847 (E.D. Pa.)
(noting that Samurais are manufactured by Japanese corporation, Suzuki Motors Co., Ltd.,
and American subsidiary, Suzuki Motor Corp.).
46. See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (discussing commercial marketplace's
inability to provide forum for consumer exchange with advertiser and political marketplace's
ability to provide an indirect forum for channeling consumer discontent to advertiser).
47. See Rudd, supra note 45, at C 8 (quoting plaintiff's attorney saying that Suzuki
Motor Corp. knew vehicle could overturn at forty miles per hour, but Suzuki deceived
customers by failing to warn them).
48. See WARNING: The Suzuki Rolls Over Too Easily, 53 CONSUMER REp. 424, July
1988 (giving Suzuki Samurai first unacceptable rating in decade because of tendency to overturn
in accident avoidance maneuvers and calling Samurai unfit for intended use).
49. See infra notes 52-53 (noting both disincentive to counterspeak in commercial context
because of extreme cost and incentive to counterspeak in political context because of minimal
cost).
50. See L.A. Times, July 7, 1988, § 4, at 1, col. 5 (reporting that Samurai sales plunged
70.6% from year earlier). But see N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1988, § 1, at 52, col. 3 (reporting
that because poor publicity decreased sales, manufacturer reduced sticker price by $2000 and
18,500 people then were willing to purchase Samurai).
51. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing efficiency of political
marketplace in verifying information otherwise unavailable to consumers).
52. See Stearns, Roe v. Wade: Our Struggle Continues, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 9
n.35 (urging women to mobilize specifically for pro-choice by contacting legislators either
through listed phone numbers or listed addresses).
53. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (discussing how cost of counterspeak
outweighs benefits to consumer in commercial marketplace of ideas).
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amassing of consumer discontent, which is difficult to catalyze in a purely
commercial context, is catalyzed actively in a political marketplace if enough
consumers complain.14 Within the political process, a sufficient public outcry
can result in a congressional hearing that petitions the presentation of
statistics on the number of accidents involving Suzuki's vehicles versus other
kinds of vehicles, and perhaps gives Suzuki officials an opportunity to
explain any discrepancy.5 5 Consequently, through the political marketplace
of ideas, the consumer ultimately obtains the type of information that the
commercial speaker could have or should have released in the original offer
to sell the product.5 6 Thus the varying machinations between the commercial
and political marketplace of ideas confirm that commercial speech may be
more verifiable to the speaker, but not to the listener.5 7 Therefore, to the
extent that the Supreme Court based its bright line distinction on the
determination that commercial speech possesses greater verifiability, the
Court's bright line distinction is applied inconsistently.58
The Court's second assumption that supports the distinction between
commercial and political speech, greater durability,5 9 also is deficient in
providing a means of distinguishing the two types of speech. 0 The Supreme
Court reasons that, because business ventures depend on advertising for
market exposure, commercial speech is more durable than political speech . 6
54. See Lankard & Wilson, Target of Opportunity, ATOWEEK, Oct. 17, 1989, at 18
(reporting that National Highway Traffic Safety Association gets statistics from fatal accident
reporting system that 26 deaths are associated with Samurai rollovers).
55. See id. (reporting that Senator Tim Wirth's (D-Colo.) two-part petition seeks "vehicle
stability standard" and calls for National Highway Traffic Safety Administration investigation
into all sport-utility vehicles); also DeLorenzo, Suzuki Stands Tough on Rollover Charges,
AtrroMorvE NEws, Mar. 3, 1988, at 3 (stating that Suzuki officials attribute rollovers to
drivers' use of alcohol, failure to wear seatbelts, age and traffic citations).
56. See L.A. Times, Mar. 24, 1989, § 4, at 1, col. 5 (reporting Suzuki's American
subsidiary settled lawsuit by agreeing to include warning statements about handling of their
sport-utility vehicles in all future advertising). All radio and television advertisements for not
only the Samurai model, but also the Sidekick model, must include the following statement:
"This vehicle handles differently from ordinary passenger cars. Federal law cautions to avoid
sharp turns and abrupt maneuvers." Id. This after-the-fact remedy reflects information that
Suzuki should have released to the consumers without resort to a lawsuit. See id. (announcing
that Suzuki's settlement to include warnings about vehicle's safety came 10 months after suit
commenced).
57. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text (discussing inability of consumer to
verify information received through commercial advertising in context of Suzuki Samurai).
58. See supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text (outlining invalidity of Court's as-
sumption that commercial speech is more verifiable than political speech); also supra notes
17-24 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's assumption that commercial speech
is more verifiable).
59. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's position
that commercial speech is more durable than political speech).
60. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (discussing invalidity of Supreme Court's
assumption that commercial speech is more durable than political speech).
61. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Citizen Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (discussing how commercial speaker's dependency on profits




Thus, the Court further reasons that, regardless of the extent of regulation,
the regulation will not completely suppress commercial speech.62 The Court,
however, fails to recognize that political speakers are primarily dependent
on media exposure to insure reelection or merely to encourage donations
used for a reelection campaign just as commercial speakers are dependent
on the exposure to maximize profits.6 3 Consequently, to the extent that the
Court bases the bright line distinction between commercial and political
speech on commercial speech's durability, the bright line distinction is
arbitrary and ignores practical reality.64 Thus, because the Court's deter-
mination regarding the durability and verifiability of commercial speech is
unfounded, courts continue to protect political speech yet regulate com-
mercial speech based on an unsupported contention that a quantifiable
distinction exists.
65
A second reason to question the Supreme Court's bright line distinctions
between commercial and political speech, is that, even if the underlying
assumptions are valid,6 the Court does not possess the ability to differentiate
accurately between commercial and political speech.67 The problem is that
62. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
63. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (reasoning that electorate's increasing
dependence on mass media for news and information makes all channels of communication
indispensable mediums for effective political speech); also id. (holding that every communication
requires expenditure of money and, therefore, restricting expenditures likewise restricts speech);
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)
(stating that profit motive is irrelevant to inquiry of whether content of speech is commercial
or political). See generally First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 783 (1978) (revealing
how political speech may be tied to profit motive). But see Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1394-95 (1990) (upholding statute that prohibits corporations
from using corporate treasury funds for independent expenditures in support of or in opposition
to any state political candidate). The Court reasoned that corporations should not be able to
use wealth amassed in a economic marketplace to obtain tactical advantages in a political
marketplace. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397. The Court focused the inequity on the lack of
correlation between economic support for a corporation's product or service and political
support for a corporation's ideas. Id. However, in response to the Court's decision a noted
first amendment scholar, Steven Shiffrin, commented that no corporation puts out speech
without intending to profit in one way or another. Sugawara, High Court Curbing Companies:
Decisions Are Shrinking First Amendment Rights of Businesses, Washington Post, April 5,
1990, at E12, col. 4.
64. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (supporting invalidity of Supreme
Court's assumption that commercial speech is more durable than political speech).
65. See supra notes 37-58 and accompanying text (discussing Court's flawed assumptions
that commercial speech and political speech quantifiably are different). But see supra note 15
(listing exceptions to first amendment protection of political speech).
66. See supra notes 16-28 and accompanying text (discussing Court's assumptions as if
valid); cf. supra notes 37-65 and accompanying text (discussing invalidity of Court's assump-
tions).
67. See infra notes 68-97 and accompanying text (discussing Court's inability to differ-
entiate accurately between commercial and political speech); also Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 536 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (charging that, because distinction
between commercial and political speech is unclear, plurality erred in assuming that govern-
mental unit can distinguish between them).
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the assumptions' validity in theory depends on the speech appearing in a
pure political or commercial form./s However, because speech rarely appears
in a "pure" form due to the often mixed motives of the speaker, 69 the
theoretical validity of the assumptions is irrelevant.70 Because the actual
content of a message contains varying proportions of each motive, the
Court should not "draw lines" and allow free exchange for one type of
speech and not for the other type.71 Consequently, the Court is engaging in
a fiction by labeling speech either "political" or "commercial". 72 Labeling
speech is completely dependent upon the factual context, thereby making
an arbitrary categorization impracticable and imprecise.
7
1
68. See United States Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United
States, 708 F.2d 760, 769 (D.C.Cir. 1983) (stating that distinction between commercial and
political speech is not entirely unworkable because distinction can operate successfully at
extremes of patently political and wholly commercial speech). For example, a lawyer's in-
person solicitation of a client often is considered wholly commercial speech or "pure"
commercial speech. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 454 (1978). However, the
attorney's solicitation could be made political if the client's position represents one side of an
issue that is hotly contested in the community. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 442
(1963) (striking down malpractice statute that made attorney's solicitation of employment from
organization primarily created to eliminate racial discrimination illegal if client was not party
to suit or had no pecuniary interest in suit). Similarly, an attorney's solicitation is politicized
if securing the client will assist in pursuing political association or office. See In Re Primus,
436 U.S. 412, 422-25 (1978) (granting first amendment protection as political expression to
lawyer soliciting prospective female litigants and advising women of legal rights resulting from
improper sterilization).
69. See United States Southwest Afica/Namibia Trade & Culture Council v. United
States, 708 F.2d 760, 769 (D.C.Cir. 1983) (stating that commercial speech is capable of
simultaneously communicating political and social messages); supra notes 68-69 (discussing
inherent overlap of issues and mixed motives present in all speech).
70. See Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., v. Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338, 1344 (S.D,N.Y. 1984) (stating
that because of inherent overlap of commercial, social, and political messages, distinction
between commercial and political speech is not always clearcut); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 788 (1985) (recognizing that even pure advertising
may include public issues); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-68 (1983)
(reasoning that communications may be commercial speech regardless of discussions of com-
pelling public issues); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 538-39 (1981) (recognizing
potential political aspect when commercial speakers attempt to influence commercial prefer-
ences). The Metromedia Court pondered the difficulty of labeling commercial or political a
United Auto Workers billboard that stated: "Be a patriot-do not buy Japanese-manufactured
cars." Id.; see also Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 570 n.20 (1978) (stating that almost
every issue can be seen by certain parties as political).
71. See Namibia Trade Council, 708 F.2d at 769 (stating that hazy line divides commercial
from political speech).
72. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing inability to distinguish
commercial from political speech).
73. Cf. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 570 n.20 (1978) (stating that same issue
may be political in one context and may be interpreted quite differently in another context);
Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 977-78 (D.C.Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985)
(noting court's inability to draw bright line distinctions between fact and opinion because same
words convey different meanings in different contexts); see infra notes 74-97 and accompanying
text (discussing possible factual disputes affecting how speech is labelled).
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A practical example of the incumbent factual disputes the Court creates
by labeling speech as political or commercial is the abortion issue, which
courts predominantly have typified as political
74 and not commercial. 75
However, looking beyond the surface adversarial nature of pro-choice versus
pro-life, the actual abortion issues litigated often are commercial in nature.
76
For example, a commercial issue often commingled with the political abor-
tion issue is a private abortion clinics' dependence on and need to maintain
government funding.7 7 Similarly, hospitals that rely on government funding
to operate may not be able to continue offering abortion services. 78 More
indirectly, clinics in states that continue to support abortion services might
have difficulty advertising in states that do not support abortion services.
7 9
Finally, and more generally, the ability of clinics to act as a going concern
is seriously jeopardized without the exposure obtained through advertising,
especially for those clinics located at state borders. 0 Thus, any entity-
74. See In Re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1022 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990) (challenging Church's tax exempt status under Internal
Revenue Code because of Church's participation in political campaigns for anti-abortion);
Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681, 685 (9th
Cir. 1988) (claiming that abortion is one of most hotly contested issues of day); Coalition for
Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 584 F.
Supp. 985, 989 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that bus company had allowed other political
messages to appear on advertising space of buses, therefore company must let abortion rights
group so advertise).
75. See infra notes 76-93 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty in labeling abortion
as purely political or purely commercial).
76. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing commercial elements of
abortion issue).
77. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306-11 (1980) (holding that states participating
in Medicaid are not required to pay for medically necessary abortions that are not reimbursable
under federal Hyde Amendment); also Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1434
(1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et. seq. (1982) (refusing to reimburse states
through Medicaid program for medically unnecessary abortions).
78. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3050-53 (1989) (upholding
Missouri statute that prohibits use of public facilities, employees, or funds to perform
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-80 (1977) (upholding Connecticut regulation
allowing Medicaid funding for childbirth but not for abortion).
79. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986)
(holding that states' greater power to ban product includes lesser power to ban advertising);
also Capital Broadcasting, Inc. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971) (banning cigarette
advertising without banning manufacture of cigarettes). But see Carey v. Population Serv.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-02 (1977) (holding that ban on advertising contraceptives is unconsti-
tutional suppression of speech that is unjustified by offensive and embarrassing nature of
product). Compare Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (holding that abortion clinic
in New York where abortion was legal could advertise in Virginia where abortion was not
legal) with Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (upholding Missouri
statutes that regulate not only abortion services, but also regulate indirect influences on
abortion such as public facilities, employees and funding).
80. See Stearns, supra note 52, at 4 n.13 (stating that in first two years that abortion
was legal in New York State, nearly two-thirds of 400,000 abortions were performed on
nonresident women).
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private or otherwise-that offers abortion services, yet relies on government
funding, faces not only the political ramifications from continuing to offer
the service (protestors picketing the property and harassing patients), but
also the more existence threatening problem of obtaining subsidies if the
government withdraws its previous support."'
In 1975 the United States Supreme Court in Bigelow v. Virginia2 faced
a mixed-motive abortion advertisement. 3 The Bigelow Court considered
whether both political and commercial elements exist in abortion advertising,
and if so, whether both elements merit first amendment protection.14 In
Bigelow the plaintiff, a newspaper editor, published in The Virginia Weekly
an advertisement for a New York City abortion clinic. 5 As a result, the
State of Virginia prosecuted the plaintiff for violations of a Virginia statute
prohibiting circulation of publications that encourage or prompt women to
have abortions.8 6 In considering whether the plaintiff violated the statute,
the Supreme Court reasoned that the advertisement relayed information of
value to a wide range of people, not just to those in need of services.8 7 In
addition, the Court reasoned that speech is not automatically beyond the
81. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (discussing commercial side-effects that
coexist in what traditionally is viewed as political issue).
82. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
83. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 812 (1975). In Bigelow the State of Virginia
prosecuted the plaintiff for publishing an advertisement in a Virginia newspaper that encouraged
nonresident women to have abortions in New York:
"UNWANTED PREGNANCY
LET US HELP YOU
Abortions are now legal in New York.
There are no residency requirements.
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED




NEw YORK, N.Y. 10022
or call any time
(212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We will make all arrangements for you and help you
with information and counseling."
Id. at 808.
84. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 819-26.
85. Id. at 811-12.
86. Id. at 812-13.
87. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822 (recognizing that advertisement by an out-of-state
abortion clinic benefited individuals other than those in need of services). For example, the
Bigelow Court refers to those with either general curiosity about or general interest in abortion
or in seeking reform specifically in Virginia. Id. The Court refers to persons more indirectly
benefited as those with a general curiosity or general interest in laws of another state or in
the development of laws in another state. Id.
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protection of the first amendment simply because the advertisement solicited
readers to purchase a product"8 or because the commercial speaker paid for
the advertisement 9 or sought financial reward. 90 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that Virginia constitutionally could not prohibit the publication of
an advertisement that served the public's constitutional interests to receive
information, whether commercial or political. 91
In later decisions, however, the Court substantially retreated from
Bigelow's protection for commercial speechY2 Further, by failing to recognize
that speech simultaneously can possess both commercial and political qual-
ities, the Court has allowed legislatures selectively to regulate the content
of commercial speech, depending on the relevant policy considerations rather
than on ascertainable distinctions between the two types of speech. 93 For
example, Congress has instituted several regulations on cigarette labeling
and advertising because such advertisements are seen as harmful commercial
speech. 94 However, because cigarettes implicate the public policy of pro-
tecting the health and safety of citizens, legislatures alternatively could have
labeled cigarette advertising as political speech and not regulated the speech.95
88. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1943) (holding that solely
because religious literature is sold rather than donated does not make religion commercial
enterprise).
89. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (stating that advertising
which expresses opinion and grievance on treatment of civil rights demonstrators while soliciting
readers for donations cannot be regulated as commercial speech solely because advertiser paid
for advertisement); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959), reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 950
(1960) (holding that dissemination of books and print materials is form of constitutionally
protected freedom, regardless of commercial context).
90. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818; see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531, reh'g
denied, 323 U.S. 819 (1945) (holding that first amendment protections are not reserved solely
for religious or political goals, but also for business or economic activity).
91. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822-25; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762-65 (1976) (holding that both individual
consumer and society in general have interest in free flow of commercial information).
92. See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's shift from
full first amendment protection to qualified first amendment protection of commercial speech);
also supra note 14 (listing cases that manifest Supreme Court's retreat from Bigelow's protection
of commercial speech).
93. See C. BAKER, HtrMN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 196 (1989) (concluding
that inconsistent application of regulation against seemingly similar types of speech affords
too much discretion to legislatures); infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing
underlying policy considerations for commercial advertising of cigarettes and referring to
overlap of commercial and political elements in speech).
94. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331-1339 (1988) (regulating labeling
and advertising of cigarette advertising). The United States Congress' purpose in enacting the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking requiring the labeling of cigarette packages with the statement
"Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health," is to provide the public
with adequate warning of cigarette smoking's potential hazards. Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act of 1965, S. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONo. & ADMN. NEws 2350, 2350 (1965) [hereinafter Cigarette Labeling Act].
95. See Cigarette Labeling Act, supra note 94, at 2351 (stating that Surgeon General
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The government chooses to label cigarette advertisements as commercial
speech, therefore, not because the distinction between the different types of
speech is clear, but because this legislation has far reaching implications in
a variety of commercial sectors in the United States economy.96 The Court's
inconsistent application of labels to uphold policy-driven state regulation is
not limited to product advertising, but also encompasses service industry
advertising. 97 Therefore, the Court has categorized various service industries'
advertising as both commercial and noncommercial, not because of any
quantifiable differences in speech, but because of different policy consid-
erations prevailing at the time."
The abortion and cigarette advertising examples of the Court's incon-
sistent application of labels highlight the inappropriateness of regulating
commercial speech.9 By continuing to regulate commercial speech, the Court
has splintered the goal of the first amendment into "truth"'' 0 for commercial
expression, but "freedom of expression"'' for political expression. 0 2 The
appointed advisory committee to study relationship of smoking to health); also supra note 94
(referring to policy of Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act outlined in legislative history).
96. See Cigarette Labeling Act, supra note 94, at 2352 (stating that, despite broad public
health implications of cigarette smoking, hazardous nature of smoking also implicates tobacco
raising and manufacturing industries as well as those who market tobacco products). Without
expressly stating that economic concerns are superior to public health concerns, Congress is
balancing the quantifiable commercial speech effects on the economy against the amorphous
public health risks. Congress compromises by banning the advertising to minimize health risks,
but maintaining production to maximize economic benefit. Id. at 2351-52.
97. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 372-75, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 917
(1977) (upholding constitutional right of lawyers to advertise prices of certain routine services);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Citizens Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773
(1976) (striking down prohibition on pharmacists' release of prescription drug prices as violative
of first amendment); ef. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1979) (upholding statute that
prohibits optometrists from operating under trade names as valid state interest of preventing
public deception); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489-91, reh'g denied, 349 U.S.
925 (1955) (upholding state restrictions on advertisement of prices for eyeglass frames); Semler
v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611-12 (1935) (upholding state
restrictions on both advertisement of prices for dentists' services and on claims of superior
professional performance).
98. See supra note 97 (listing cases in which courts inconsistently have upheld or struck
down limitations on similar service industry advertising).
99. See supra notes 74-98 and accompanying text (discussing intermingling of commercial
and political issues in context of abortion and cigarettes).
100. See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that first
amendment preserves uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth ultimately prevails);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (articulating
primary goal of first amendment as truth competing successfully over falsehood).
101. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (considering case
against background of national commitment to wide-open, robust and uninhibited debate of
public issues); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (stating
that first amendment presupposes that correct conclusions result only from many viewpoints,
rather than from governmental selection).
102. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (holding that
first amendment guarantee of free speech serves significant societal interests distinct from
individual speakers' interest in self-expression); infra notes 103-115 and accompanying text
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Court's distinction finds some textual support in the Bill of Rights, which
indirectly recognizes political freedom. 03 An objective "truth," however, is
a much more subtle social want that the Court now requires in commercial
speech,' 4 but only desires in political speech. 0°
The Court's assertion of different goals for both commercial and
political speech is deficient in two respects.106 First, "truth" and "freedom
of expression" do not have to be mutually exclusive goals of the first
amendment.' 7 Rather, the two could be concurrent goals, because freedom
of expression ultimately is just a medium eventually to ferret out truth. 08
Second, assuming that truth is the ultimate goal for any type of speech, °9
regulation is not the most rational and efficient way to attain truth." 0
Contrary to the Court's belief that regulation assists in the search for
truth, regulation instead suppresses speech and influences public decision-
making through manipulation of the availability of necessary information."'
In other words, the Court's regulation, especially of truthful, nonmisleading,
informational advertising, indirectly sets the political agenda by limiting
consumers' access to valuable information-true or false-needed for many
(discussing inaccuracy of splintering goals as well as viability of concurrent first amendment
goals).
103. See supra note 1 (asserting that concept of "political freedom" is derived from text
of first amendment). The specific derivation of "political freedom" within the text of the first
amendment is the "right to peaceably assemble" and the "right to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances". U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
104. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Citizens Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (noting that although state may not completely suppress
commercial speech, state may regulate to insure unimpaired flow of TRuTHnur information)
(emphasis added).
105. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-92 (1964) (holding that first
amendment tolerates factual errors in political speech, therefore plaintiffs need to meet high
standard of proof (actual malice) to recover for violation of constitutional tort of libel). By
holding that factual errors within political speech do not negate first amendment protection
of such speech, the Sullivan Court determined that truth should not be the primary goal of
political speech. Id. Rather, to prevent self-censorship and to allow political speakers "breathing
space," the first amendment must tolerate nontruths. Id.
106. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining deficiency of splintering first
amendment goals).
107. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining why truth and freedom of
expression do not have to be mutually exclusive goals of first amendment).
108. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984) (stating that
freedom to speak one's mind is essential to common quest for truth); also T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1971) (suggesting that unrestricted speech inextricably
is bound to individual's search for truth).
109. See supra note 100 (claiming that collective good is realized if truth remains ultimate
goal of first amendment).
110. See infra notes 111-205 and accompanying text (discussing rational and efficient
alternatives to regulation of commercial speech).
I11. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
579 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that no differences between commercial and
political speech justify suppressing former and manipulating access to information); also Village
of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party, 69 Ill.2d 605, 615, 373 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1978) (quoting Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971)) (declining to assume that forbidding certain words
likewise will not increase risk of suppressing ideas).
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day-to-day personal economic decisions." 2 For instance, a state's paternal-
istic protection of its citizens depends in large part on consumers' acquies-
cence to Government's idea of what information commercial speakers should
and should not release to consumers rather than on consumers gathering
their own information and independently making decisions."' Although the
Supreme Court recognizes the Government's role as purveyor of informa-
tion, the Court paternalistically reasons that state and federal regulation is
required to diligently protect the accurate, "free" flow of information to
consumers." 4 The Court errs, however, in assuming that regulation of
commercial speech is the only way to preserve the truthful, unimpaired flow
of information to consumers."'
Rather than regulating commercial speech, several possible alternatives
exist to create an efficient "marketplace of ideas" for commercial speakers
while eradicating court-made distinctions between commercial and political
speech." 6 Opponents of regulated commercial speech argue that one alter-
native to government regulation of commercial speech is to allow the tort
system to remedy any resulting harms.1 7 The tort theory proponents contend
that, by allowing all purveyors of ideas freely to compete against each
112. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(claiming that evils of falsehood in speech averted by more speech rather than enforced silence);
also C. BAKER, supra note 92, at 194 (positing theory that consumers gain experience in
accurate decisionmaking in political arena by being able to make their own private economic
decisions).
113. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Citizen Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 769 (1976) (stating that state's protectiveness of citizens depends on state maintaining
citizens' ignorance). See generally S. LuIcs, POWER: A RArIcAL Viaw (1974) (positing that
most effective use of power is to prevent observable conflict from arising by shaping and
manipulating cognitions and preferences in fashion that leaves minority accepting their role in
status quo). Lukes states that the easiest way to prevent observable conflict while shaping
perceptions is to suppress information of whatever variety. Id. at 24.
114. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
564-65 (1980) (holding that because commercial speech serves only informational function,
there is no first amendment violation to suppress inaccurate advertising that provides inaccurate
information). But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (claiming that
under first amendment, no such thing as false idea).
115. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (holding that because
under first amendment no such thing as false idea, however seemingly pernicious an opinion,
correction of falsities depends on competition of ideas, not on conscience of judicial system);
infra notes 117-205 and accompanying text (discussing alternatives to regulation as means of
preserving free flow of information to consumers).
116. See infra notes 117-205 and accompanying text (discussing three possible alternatives
to government regulation of commercial speech).
117. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557,
598 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that marketplace of ideas will expose misleading
speech, perhaps not early enough to avoid harm to numerous people, but delay is risk accepted
against benefits of democratic society). See generally, Note, Constitutional Law - Eimann v.
Soldier of Fortune and 'Negligent Advertising' Actions: Commercial Speech in an Era of
Reduced First Amendment Protection, 64 NOTRE Dmaz L. REv. 157 (1989) (attributing




other, the competition will expose and eradicate misleading advertisements." 8
Tort theory proponents recognize that one drawback to the tort system is
that discovery of the deception may not always precede, and therefore
prevent, harm to many people. 119 However, the proponents argue that
insistence on a democratic society presupposes that the benefits of protecting
free speech outweigh any risk of harm to democracy's beneficiaries.
20
Therefore, the proponents of the tort system alternative to commercial
speech regulation state that, because a tort system is ready and able to
compensate victims of fraudulent or harmful wrongs, government regulation
of commercial speech is unnecessary.'
2'
In Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.'22 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently reviewed the effectiveness
of an "after-the-fact" tort remedy as compensation for harms resulting
from misleading speech.1'1 In Eimann the Fifth Circuit considered whether
Soldier of Fortune magazine published an ambiguous advertisement' 24 that
a reader may have construed as a proposal to engage in criminal activity.
25
A husband responded to the advertisement by requesting his wife's murder,
and the advertiser complied. 126 Consequently, the deceased wife's relatives
brought a wrongful death action against the magazine, alleging that the
magazine was negligent for failing to predict that such criminal activity
could occur. 27 In response, the publisher and several staff testified to the
magazine's lack of knowledge that the advertisement was a solicitation for
criminal activity. 'n Rather, the advertising manager claimed to have viewed
the advertisements as possible offers for security guard employment.
29
118. See supra notes 20 and 100 (defining competition in marketplace of ideas as truth
prevailing over falsity).
119. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (conceding inability
of marketplace of ideas to consistently expose truth before anyone is harmed).
120. Id.; see also Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1025-26 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988) (Jones, J., dissenting) (arguing that equating pornog-
raphy with commercial speech for purpose of permitting lawsuits does not mark demise of
participatory democracy).
121. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1025 (Jones, J., dissenting) (contending that state may
choose to impose civil liability on harms caused by pornographic business industry); supra
notes 114-18 and accompanying text (discussing tort system alternative to remedy harms
resulting from commercial speech).
122. 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 729 (1990).
123. Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830, 831, (5th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 729 (1990).
124. Id. at 831. In Soldier of Fortune, the magazine published in the September, October,
and November of 1984 issues of SOLDMR OF FORTUNE an advertisement that read as follows:
"EX-MARINES-67-69 Nam Vets, Ex-DI, weapons specialist-junge warfare, pilot, M.E.,
high risk assignments, U.S. or overseas. (404) 991-2684." Id. The Soldier of Fortune court
noted that "Ex-DI" meant ex-drill instructor; "M.E." meant multi-engine planes; and "high
risk assignments" referred to work as a bodyguard or security specialist. Id.
125. Id. at 833.
126. Id. at 831-32.
127. Id. at 832-33.
128. Id. at 833.
129. Id.
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The Eimann trial court instructed the jury that for the plaintiffs to
recover the jury must determine that a reasonable, prudent publisher in the
same or similar circumstances would have concluded that the advertisement
in question was an offer to commit crimes and, therefore, should not have
been published. 130 After finding that a reasonable publisher should not have
published the advertisement, the jury determined that the publisher was
liable to the plaintiffs.' 3' Consequently, the trial court held that, because
SOLDIER OF FORTuN's negligent publication of the advertisement was a
proximate cause of decedent's death, the magazine's actions represented
gross negligence.
32
By upholding the jury's verdict, the trial court's decision placed a
burden on all publishers to discern the appropriateness of ambiguous
advertisements. 3 3 On appeal, because of the pervasiveness of advertising in
our society and the impracticability of publishers adequately to assess the
potential criminal intent of a myriad of advertisers, 3 4 the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the lower court's decision placed an undue burden on pub-
lishers. 3 Thus, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision . 36
In reversing the trial court's decision, however, the Fifth Circuit failed
to address the publisher's claim that imposing tort liability for publishing
an ambiguous advertisement violated the magazine's first amendment free
speech rights. 37 On the other hand, the appellate court refused to let the
plaintiffs recover because the court reasoned that protected commercial
speech would be a fiction if the protections lapsed whenever the product
advertised was susceptible of illegal use. 31 In balancing the competing
interests, the Fifth Circuit feared opening the door to a plethora of litigation,
but likewise feared giving publishers immunity from future harms that may
occur as a result of more direct and less ambiguous commercial advertising
130. Id.
131. Id. The jury in Soldier of Fortune awarded plaintiffs $1.9 million in compensatory
damages and $7.5 million in punitive damages. Id.
132. Id. In finding the magazine's actions grossly negligent, the court relied on a definition
of "gross negligence" as "conscious indifference." Id.
133. See id. at 834 (claiming that jury's verdict did not place duty to investigate on
publisher, but rather did impose more rigorous standard of care that publisher had duty to
recognize potentially criminal advertisements and refrain from printing those advertisements).
134. Id. at 832-33. In Soldier of Fortune the plaintiffs presented expert testimony from
Dr. Park Diet, a forensic psychiatrist who had studied SoLDiER OF FoRTUNE, its advertisements,
and readership. Id. Although Dr. Dietz claimed that an average SOLDYER OF FoRTuNE subscriber
likely would interpret certain advertisements as solicitations for illegal activity, Dr. Dietz
conceded that he had abandoned any attempts to distinguish lawful SOLDIER OF FoRTUNE
classified advertisements from criminal ones on the basis of specific code words such as "gun
for hire," "mechanic" and "hunter" because some advertisements were too ambiguous
assuredly to assign an illegal meaning to them. Id. at 833.
135. Id. at 835-37.
136. Id. at 838.
137. Id. at 836.
138. Id. at 837.
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than that at issue in Eimann.'39 As the Fifth Circuit concluded, the tort
system remedy is not a promising alternative to regulation first because the
remedy allows speakers to avoid liability only through self-censorship, and
second because the system redresses harms that potentially are preventable.'
40
Instead of externally compensating for the failings of the commercial
speech marketplace of ideas by flooding courts with tort litigation, as the
first alternative suggests, 141 a better alternative is to add to the marketplace
of ideas a government-sponsored voice to counterbalance the singular voice
of the seller. 42 The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 198514 (the Act)
provides one example of a government-sponsored voice designed to act in
the public interest by financing a program to promote and research the beef
industry./" The Act imposes a one dollar per head assessment on cattle
producers and importers to finance beef industry advertising and research,
regardless of whether the producers and importers agree with the govern-
ment's promotional pitch.1
45
In United States v. Frame'" the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit considered whether the Beef Research and Promotion Act,
specifically the government-sponsored voice, contravened the free speech
clause of the first amendment.' 47 In Frame the government brought an
action against Frame, a cattle producer and buyer, for failing both to collect
and pay the per head assessments on the sale of cattle. 4 Frame argued
139. See id. at 837-38 (holding that risk and gravity of harms from potentially criminal
advertisements are outweighed by onerous burden on publisher to predict readers' perceptions
of advertisements).
140. Id.; see also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2612 (1989) (stating that potential
imposition of tort liability likely will result in self-censorship); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (holding that punishing publishers for printing truthful
information will invite timidity and self-censorship).
141. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text (discussing potential of tort remedy
to overburden courts).
142. See infra notes 143-80 and accompanying text (discussing second alternative of
government counterspeech through private parties).
143. Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1597,
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-18) (1988).
144. See Beef Research and Promotion Act of 1985, S. REP. No. 99-145, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AnmN. NEws 1676, 2165-66 (stating that
Congress intended that financing program would ensure that beef and beef products readily
would be available and efficiently marketed to ensure that citizens receive adequate nourish-
ment). Congress stated in the legislative history that the goal of the advertising program, more
specifically, is to inform the public that consumption of beef is desirable, healthy and nutritious.
Id.
145. Beef Research and Promotion Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2904(8)(C) (1988). But see Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 10-18 (1986) (holding that order
of Public Utilities Commission compelling utility to place newsletter containing views of third
party in its billing envelopes penalized expression of utility's own points of view and forced
utility to alter its speech to conform with agenda utility did not set).
146. 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990).
147. United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1121-22 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1168 (1990).
148. Id. at 1124-25.
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that, because the government collected the funds for a nationwide media
campaign to solidify and hopefully to increase beef and beef products'
market share, the Act violated his first amendment rights by compelling
Frame to participate in a message with which he disagreed. 49 Consequently,
although several other promotion and research programs existed for agri-
cultural commodities,"50 Frame alleged that the Act was unconstitutional
because the Act violated his first amendment rights to free association and
free speech.
15 1
In determining whether the Act conflicted with the first amendment,
the district court in Frame reasoned that no rational basis existed for
allowing the first amendment to limit the government's right to speak when
the amendment simultaneously protects and expands other speakers' rights.
5 2
For example, the district court stated that the Beef Promotion advertising
campaign was no different than the campaigns of the armed forces, Social
Security, or Voice of America advertisements, all of which Frame indirectly
subsidized with his tax dollars.' The district court concluded that, because
the campaign was a form of "government speech," the campaign did not
force the individual to embrace the ideological position as the individual's
own, rather the campaign communicated only the viewpoint of the federal
government. 
54
The Third Circuit disagreed with the district court's finding that, because
the funding of expressive conduct through the Act is government speech,
the Act does not implicate Frame's first amendment rights. '" The Third
Circuit reasoned that, to avoid violating Frame's first amendment rights,
the government must be compelling payment only on projects in which the
government is acting as a representative of the people.5 6 The Court of
Appeals further reasoned that the Cattleman's Board and the Operating
Committee are only representative of one segment of the population, namely
the beef industry. 5 7 The court determined that, because the speech in which
149. Id. at 1129; see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1977) (holding that
citizen has constitutional right to refrain from speaking and that state may not require dissenting
citizen to bear state slogan, "Live Free or Die," on automobile license-plate); supra note 146
(citing legislative history of Beef Research and Promotion Act and indicating that Congress
intended Act to promote beef industry).
150. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1122; see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 2101-18 (1988) (subsidizing cotton);
7 U.S.C. §§ 2611-27 (1988) (subsidizing potatoes); §§ 7 U.S.C. 2701-18 (1988) (subsidizing
eggs); 7 U.S.C. §§ 4501-13 (1988) (subsidizing dairy products); 7 U.S.C. §§ 4601-12 (1988)
(subsidizing honey); 7 U.S.C. §§ 4801-19 (1988) (subsidizing pork); 7 U.S.C. §§ 4901-16 (1988)
(subsidizing watermelons).
151. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1129.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1129-30.
154. Id. at 1129.
155. Id. at 1131-32.
156. Id.; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13 (1977) (Powell,
J. concurring) (providing that compelled support of private associations is fundamentally
different from compelled support of government).
157. See Frame, 885 F.2d at 1131-32 (defining Cattleman's Board as representative of one
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the Cattleman's Board engaged was not government speech, Frame's first
amendment rights were in fact implicated. 58 Nonetheless, in Frame the
Third Circuit denied Frame's first amendment challenge to the Act because
the government's interest in maintaining and expanding beef markets is
sufficiently compelling to override Frame's first amendment interest.
59
Although the Third Circuit failed to recognize a violation of Frame's
first amendment right against compelled speech, the Frame court correctly
recognized that consumers benefit when a "federal" view joins the mar-
ketplace of ideas. However, that benefit is lost if the consumer cannot
determine whether a private party is engaging in free speech or whether the
government is engaging in counterspeech.160 When the commercial speaker
is indeterminable, the government is engaging in the very misleading adver-
tising that initially compelled the government to regulate commercial speech. 16'
Thus, although the second alternative to government regulation adds a voice
to commercial debate, compelling that voice through private individuals
creates new and equally harmful, deceptive practices.
62
The public deception of government-compelled speech through private
individuals is dissipated if the public does not falsely perceive that a private
individual is speaking. 63 For example, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins'64 the United States Supreme Court considered whether an ethnic
group's gathering of political petition signatures in a shopping mail violated
the mall owner's first amendment right to prevent the state from forcing
the mallowner to provide a forum for the speech of others?'65 The defendant
mall owner enforced a strict prohibition against any party engaging in
publicly expressive activity unrelated to the commercial purposes of the
mall. 66 Despite the plaintiffs' peaceful activity, security guards at the mall
segment of population because members of Board and Operating Committee are members of
private sector and selected from State organizations that have history of stability and whose
overriding purpose is to promote economic welfare of cattle producers).
158. Id. at 1132-33. The Frame court also noted that the airing of the Act's advertisements
reinforced the link of the "beef is healthy" message to the cattle producers by indicating that
"Beef Industry Council and Beef Board" fund the advertisements. Id. at 1133 n.11. The
advertisement did not mention the Secretary or the Department of Agriculture, despite the
government's administration of this program through these agents. Id.
159. Id. at 1133-37.
160. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (noting that government speech is
protected as long as the speech itself is representative of general public and not just one
segment of population).
161. See supra note 114 (asserting that commercial speech's role is informational, and
therefore, state can regulate if inaccurate).
162. See supra notes 141-61 and accompanying text (discussing second alternative to
regulation, allowing government to counterspeak through private individuals).
163. See infra notes 164-80 and accompanying text (discussing consumer deception involved
in government compelled speech through private individuals).
164. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
165. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80 (1980); see also id. at 77
(referring to plaintiffs as high school students seeking to solicif support for opposition to
United Nations resolution against Zionism).
166. Id.
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requested that the petitioners leave the premises. 1 7 Plaintiffs alleged that
denying access to the mall violated the plaintiffs' first amendment rights,
while the defendant alleged that the plaintiffs do not have the privilege of
asserting these constitutional rights on private property.68
In considering the first amendment claim, the Pruneyard Court first
reasoned that the mall owner voluntarily opened his property to the public. 69
The Court then noted that mall patrons likely would not equate the views
of those passing out the pamphlets with the views of the private owner.
70
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that, because the state did not dictate
a specific message that the mall owner must display on mall property, the
ethnic group's petitioning did not force the mall owner to speak against the
owner's will.' 7' Thus, the Supreme Court denied the mall owner's first
amendment claim. 72
Although both the Supreme Court in Pruneyard and the Third Circuit
in Frame denied the respective first amendment claims, the Supreme Court
in Pruneyard based its decision on several facts not present in Frame.7 1
First, although in Frame the state apportioned the defendant's property' 74
by requiring the defendant financially to support a commercial message,
the involuntary "donation" in Frame falls short of the voluntary "public-
ness" of the mall present in Pruneyard 75 Second, in the shopping mall
167. Id.
168. See id. at 85-86 (describing defendant's first amendment claim against compelled
speech); id. at 77-78 (describing plaintiff's first amendment claim of free speech).
169. Id. at 80-81.
170. Id. at 87.
171. Id. at 86-87. The Pruneyard Court, in holding that the plaintiffs' petition did not
force the mallowner to speak against his will, offered the mallowner a practical self-help
remedy of posting signs to actively disavow any connection with plaintiffs' political position.
Id.
172. Id. at 77.
173. See infra notes 174-80 and accompanying text (distinguishing Supreme Court's
reasoning in Pruneyard from Third Circuit's reasoning in Frame); also Pruneyard, 447 U.S.
at 87 (distinguishing case at bar from Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), in which
Supreme Court held that a state constitutionally may not require an individual to participate
in dissemination of ideological message ("Live Free or Die") on individual's property, namely
license plate, if message is intended to be viewed by and for public). The Frame court cited
Wooley as a case similar to Frame and stated that a close nexus between the message and the
apparent (but not actual) speaker is deceptive to viewers and constitutionally should not be
allowed. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1132-33; see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713-15
(1977) (holding that state-issued license plates are not government speech because government
is compelling individual to present ideological message on individual's private property).
174. See Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82-85 (dismissing plaintiff's claim that allowing petitioners
to solicit signatures on private property constitutes taking in violation of fifth amendment).
175. See id. at 77 (describing extent of Pruneyard mall's publicness: mall covered 21 acres
of land with 65 speciaity shops, 10 restaurants, and movie theater); see also Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 506-10 (1946) (introducing analysis of "publicness" of behavior as a limitation
on individual property rights for benefit of public's first amendment rights). The Marsh Court
stated that the more a private owner voluntarily opens up his property to the public, the more




case shoppers rarely perceive that the mall is privately-owned let alone
attribute the ideas of solicitors to that of the mall owner. 176 On the other
hand, viewers of the beef advertisements certainly will equate the sales pitch
with the producers themselves because the commercial itself attributes the
producers with funding the advertisement, in addition to being the parties
most likely to benefit from increased sales. 177 Finally, unlike a mall, where
many differing viewpoints seek to solicit the attention of shoppers, the
federal government in Frame is dictating a consistently specific message
with the defendant's property; that consumption of beef is nutritious and
healthy, 7 ' a message with which the defendant disagrees and, therefore,
should not have to subsidize. 179 Thus, the two decisions based on distinct
factors are consistent in that the courts disfavor compelled speech when the
speech deceives consumers about who actually is speaking.8 0
Given the limitations of the first two alternatives, that the tort system
allows only for an after-the-fact remedy that fails to narrow the class of
potential plaintiffs, and that unidentified compelled speech creates new and
equally harmful deceptive practices, a final alternative optimally resolves
these limitations by requiring the government to speak, but on the govern-
ment's behalf.'8' Under the final alternative, the government, depending on
the nature of consumer response, could choose between offsetting the
commercial speech of the original commercial speakers with counterspeech
176. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 87 (discounting infringement on mallowner's first amendment
right to speak only as the owner chooses because mall patrons will not link solicitor's message
with mallowner).
177. See supra note 157 (citing deception of advertisement's apparent sponsor of adver-
tisement versus actual sponsor).
178. United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1129 (3d Cir. 1989).
179. See id. (referring Frame's claim that first amendment right to refrain from speaking,
allegedly was violated because Beef Research and Promotion Act forces him to contribute to
administration and financing of national media campaign to typify beef as "desirous, healthy,
nutritious").
180. Compare Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (claiming
no violation of first amendment rights against compelled speech, first, if party is not compelled
to present a particular message, second, if no connection between speaker and message and,
third, if party compelled has ability to disavow) with Frame, 885 F.2d at 1133-37 (holding
that first amendment rights are implicated if government compelled speech is not representative
of people in general, but instead is representative of only one segment of population). The
Third Circuit in Frame denied the first amendment claim only because of a compelling
government interest that outweighs the individual's interest, not because speech was not
compelled. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1134-35.
181. See L. TamE, Ai micA CoNsrrtmnoNA. LAw § 12-4, at 807-12 (2d ed. 1988)
(claiming that first amendment right against compelled speech does not preclude government
from adding its own voice to many others in marketplace of ideas). But see Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (claiming that foundation of first amendment assumes
that government remain neutral in marketplace of ideas and quoting FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
dation, 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978)). See infra notes 182-205 and accompanying text (discussing
third alternative of government counterspeech); also supra notes 139-78 and accompanying text
(discussing government compelled speech through private individuals alternative); supra notes
115-40 and accompanying text (discussing tort remedy alternative).
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or encouraging the original speech with additional favorable speech.8 2 Such
government speech gives consumers the ability to weigh the two messages
in the context of the individual consumer's private economic decisionmaking
capacity. 83 The purpose of counterspeech is not to impose state-determined
"rationality" on individuals, but to allow the state to provide consumers
with the otherwise inaccessible information that consumers need to make
informed decisions. 84 As a form of political check on government counter-
speech, a party may rebut the presumption that the government should
speak if the party can show that the government is drowning out other
commercial voices just as useful to the consumer's decisionmaking process.' 85
The benefits of counterspeech over the previously stated alternatives are
exposed when reviewing the Suzuki hypothetical. 86 For example, Suzuki
advertises the adventurous, four-wheeling lure of the Samurai, but a listener
cynically questions the Samurai's ability to corner safely at certain speeds.
87
After consumers have voiced a sufficient number of complaints in the
interest of the citizens' welfare, the government is incited to counter the
deceptive message by revealing certain facts. 88 For example, the government
advertises that Samurais tip five out of ten times when rounding a corner
at thirty miles per hour, but tip seven out of ten times at forty miles per
hour and so on. 89 The government's voice heightens the consumers' aware-
ness of a feature that the original commercial speaker has no incentive to
discuss.190 Beyond counterspeech, if the defect rises to the level of unmer-
chantability because the vehicle tips ten out of ten times, the government
182. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986)
(contending that first amendment requires advancing state interest not by suppressing com-
mercial speech that might encourage undesired results, but by instigating additional speech-
counterspeech-to discourage undesired results).
183. See C. BAKER, supra note 92, at 194 (discussing private economic decisionmaking in
marketplace of ideas).
184. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing best method to verify
information needed for private economic decisionmaking).
185. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (claiming that
potential of corporations as singular voice in marketplace of ideas is to use wealth and power
to drown out other points of view); see also L. TamE, supra note 181, § 12-4, at 807-12
(limiting right of government to counterspeak when government drowns out private commu-
nications).
186. See supra notes 44-56 (setting out Suzuki hypothetical); infra notes 187-205 (discussing
benefits of counterspeech in response to public issues).
187. See CoNsUMER REPORTS, supra note 48, at 424 (giving Suzuki Samurai first unac-
ceptable rating in decade for tendency to overturn when rounding corners).
188. See AuTOWEEK, supra note 54 at 18 (reporting that National Highway Traffic Safety
Association revealed that 26 deaths were associated with Samurai rollovers).
189. See CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 48, at 424 (reporting that Suzuki Samurais tip
when rounding corners at 40 miles per hour and therefore, Samurais are not fit for intended
use).
190. See supra note 47 (referring to Suzuki's awareness of defect, but failure to disclose).
But see supra note 56 (noting that in settling lawsuit, Suzuki agreed to include warning
statements about maneuverability of its sports-utility vehicle).
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has a duty not only to speak, but to ban the advertisements and the
manufacture of the product as well.' 9' Barring such unmerchantability,
however, the consumer is still free to purchase the vehicle, regardless of the
seeming irrationality of the decision.
192
A current example of the effectiveness of government counterspeech in
practice is the policy-making of C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General under
former President Reagan. 193 Koop, as a public health official, dealt primarily
with politically controversial issues.'94 During Koop's eight-year term, Koop
formulated specific policy positions on abortion, tobacco products, and the
AIDS epidemic, first by distancing himself from his own personal, religious,
and moral views on the respective issues, 95 and second and more impor-
tantly, by directly and informatively speaking to the public about issues and
data otherwise unavailable.'9
For example, on January 9, 1989, Koop presented President Reagan
with a report on the psychological effects of abortion. 1 Koop presented
his own data based on medical evidence which showed that studies sup-
porting the existence of postabortion trauma are flawed. 98 In fact, Koop
countered the conclusions of the traditional studies by stating that many
women felt that having an abortion was literally the best decision the women
ever made.'9 By addressing a flawed foundation for a visible political issue,
Koop's report proi'ided a medium for countering the information presently
available to the public while mitigating any possible misconceptions. 2°° Thus,
while avoiding deciding the issue per se, Koop simply added another voice
to the abortion marketplace of ideas that members of the public individually
may weigh in their own rational decisionmaking. 20 1
Because subjective social, political, religious, or moral predispositions
often influence an individual's position on other visible issues like tobacco
and AIDS, Koop's stance merely attempts to present objective medical data
191. See supra note 79 (holding that state has power not only to ban manufacturing of
product or service, but to ban advertising as well).
192. See supra note 50 (citing statistics of increased sales of Samurais at lower price
despite reports of vehicle's safety problems).
193. See Judis, Nice Guys: An Officer and a Gentleman; C. Everett Koop, NEw REP BLIC,
Jan. 23, 1989, at 19 (extolling virtues of Koop's tenure as Surgeon General).
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 241 (1982) (defining surgeon general's duties as public health officer
entrusted to promote research, experiments and studies relating to causes, diagnosis, treatment,
control and prevention of physical and mental diseases and impairments of people, including
environmental issues).
195. Judis, supra note 193 at 19.
196. Id. at 22.
197. Id. at 19.
198. Id. at 19.
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 180-92 and accompanying text (discussing critical element of govern-
ment counterspeech as voice consolidating inaccessible information for public benefit).
201. See C. BAKER, supra note 92, at 194 (discussing value of individual decisionmaking).
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as another piece of information that consumers require to make rational
decisions. 202 For example, Koop called for a smoke-free society by the year
2000 not because Koop advocated the economic decline of any tobacco-
dependent state, but because he advocated reporting to the public the medical
evidence on passive smoking.2 Similarly, despite allegations that Koop was
corrupting the nation's youth, the Surgeon General openly advocated the
use of condoms to prevent the spread of AIDS. 204 Koop focused again on
the objective medical evidence that use of a condom reduced the possibility
of spreading the virus-a fact distinct from encouraging premature sexual
activity.2 5 Thus, using Koop as an example, the government should join
the commercial marketplace of ideas by speaking to counter any significant
deception in commercial speech.206
In considering the first amendment protection of commercial speech,
the Supreme Court initially granted the speech no protection, then recon-
sidered to grant commercial speech the same full protection afforded to
political speech, but finally and most recently, quantifiably limited the first
amendment protection of commercial speech, allowing states to regulate the
speech freely. 207 Because the Court determined that commercial speech is
fundamentally different than political speech, the Court attempted to draw
bright lines between the two types of speech, allowing commercial speech
to be regulated and political speech to be protected. 20 However, because
202. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text (showing how additional information
can alter decisionmaking process of abortion).
203. Judis, supra note 193, at 20. Koop's calling for a smoke-free society arguably may
be seen as going beyond presenting objective evidence for consumers to utilize in informed
decisionmaking). See also Specter & Farhi, Critics Say Results of Targeted Tobacco Sales
Pitches are Deadly, Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1990, at 4, col. 1 (paralleling Health and
Human Services Secretary, Louis W. Sullivan, with former Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop,
in attacking smoking as country's most lethal and preventable habit). Sullivan angrily spoke
out against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.'s new cigarette brand, Uptown, which Reynolds
marketed solely for blacks. Id. Secretary Sullivan claimed that blacks as a segment of the
population are already 20% more likely to smoke, 3300 more likely to have high blood
pressure, 38% more likely to have heart disease, and 28% more likely to have cancer. NBC
NiGHTLy NEws (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 18, 1990). Sullivan concluded that targeting a
high-risk health group that already suffers a disproportionate share of the health and economic
problems related to smoking is unconscionable. Specter, Reynolds Cancels Plan to Market
New Cigarette, Washington Post, Jan. 22, 1990 at 3, col. 1. As government counterspeech,
Sullivan's enraged speech against smoking was even more effective than Koop's previous
attempts because Sullivan's outburst forced R.J.R. to cancel marketing of the new cigarette.
Id.
204. Judis, supra note 193, at 20.
205. Id. at 21-22.
206. See supra notes 186-205 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of counterspeech
as single source of public health information on which public can choose to rely).
207. See supra notes 1-31 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's progression
of opinions from originally granting liberal protection to commercial speech toward more
qualified protection).
208. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's use of
bright lines to distinguish commercial from political speech and potential failings of Supreme
Court's bright line method).
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the Court distinguishes between commercial speech and political speech
based on a faulty determination that the former is both more verifiable and
more durable than the latter, the Court's bright line scheme has become
imprecise and unworkable. 209
As alternatives to regulating commercial speech, the Court could rely
solely on the tort system to remedy harms. However, because the tort model
provides only post-injury remedies and does not narrow the potential class
of plaintiffs, more consumers will be harmed without adequate redress in
the overburdened judicial system. 210 A second alternative of allowing gov-
ernment compelled counterspeech through private individuals attempts to
prevent harms before they occur while adding additional voices to the
marketplace of ideas.211 The deficiency in the second alternative, however,
is that government compelled counterspeech creates new forms of deception
in advertising because consumers are confused about whether the government
or the private individual is the actual speaker.212 The final and most
preferential alternative to regulation of commercial speech is for government
itself to join the marketplace of ideas by engaging in counterspeech on its
own behalf for the benefit of the public.23 Under the final alternative, the
deception inherent in the compelled speech alternative is eradicated, and the
commercial marketplace of ideas is allowed to function as efficiently as the
political marketplace of ideas in consolidating otherwise inaccessible infor-
mation into a singular voice upon which the public may rely.
214
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209. See supra notes 38-115 and accompanying text (discussing both invalidity of Supreme
Court's assumptions relied on to draw bright lines and inability of Court to differentiate
between commercial and political speech even if assumptions were valid).
210. See supra notes 116-40 and accompanying text (discussing first alternative to regu-
lation as externally compensating for failings of commercial marketplace of ideas through tort
system).
211. See supra notes 141-54 and accompanying text (discussing government compelled
speech through private individuals as medium to express "federal" point of view within
marketplace of ideas).
212. See supra notes 155-80 and accompanying text (discussing second alternative to
regulation in government compelled speech through private individuals as creating consumer
deceptions if advertisements are unclear on whether government or private individuals are
sponsoring advertisement).
213. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text (discussing mechanics of government
joining marketplace of ideas to channel otherwise inaccessible information to consumers).
214. See supra notes 186-206 and accompanying text (discussing application of third
alternative of government counterspeech to specific examples as means of making otherwise
inaccessible information available to consumers).
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